An Interview with Hratch Tchilingirian

South Caucasus: A war-zone or a place for holidays?
An Interview with Hratch Tchilingirian
By Khatchig Mouradian
Aztag Daily
August 7,2004

`Abkhazia is not a place for holidays...it is a war zone,' said Georgian
leader Mikhail Saakashvili earlier this month, threatening to sink foreign
(implicitly understood as Russian) ships that enter the region without
permission from his government. His comments came as tensions escalated
between the central authorities of Georgia and two of its breakaway regions,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Saakashvili has promised to win back.
Saakashvili's pronouncements on South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been
furiously opposed by Moscow, whose relations with Georgia have plummeted
from bad to worse since a `rose revolution' brought pro-western Saakhasvili
to power.

Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia's South Caucasian neighbors, have been
struggling with problems of their own, the most important of which is the
Karabakh conflict. But despite the various international conflicts they are
engaged in, as well as their serious domestic economic and social problems
the three ex-soviet republics of the South Caucasus continue to struggle
towards political stability, reform and democracy. In this respect, the
example of Armenia is telling.

I discussed the conflicts in the South Caucasus with Hratch Tchilingirian,
who has written and lectured extensively on the region. He is Associate
Director of the Eurasia Program, the Judge Institute, University of
Cambridge. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics and
Political Science and his Master of Public Administration (MPA) from
California State University, Northridge. His research covers political and
territorial disputes in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the
region's political, economic and geostrategic developments. He has authored
over 120 articles and publications on the politics, economy, culture,
religion and social issues of the Eurasia region, especially the Caucasus
and the Armenian Diaspora.

Aztag- In the Caucasus region ethnic tensions existed during the Soviet era,
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these tensions were rekindled
and some of them became full-blown wars. Can you put these conflicts into
perspective?

Hratch Tchilingirian- One of the areas that has not been much researched
when it comes to these regional conflicts, and which I have made part of my
research, is what I call the management of minority-majority relations. You
have a number of minorities living within the majority nationalities in this
particular part of the former Soviet Union, and the tensions actually go
back before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; indeed, to the
beginning of the Soviet period. The majority of these problems were not
resolved by the sovietization of the region, they were rather frozen and,
for decades, somehow controlled or managed. These conflicts also need to be
examined from the point of view of how titular nations deal with their
minorities. When the larger group or nationality is not able to deal with
its minorities, whether for objective or subjective reasons, it creates many
problems for both the minority and the majority. I believe this is an issue
that has been overlooked, especially by western scholars.

In addition to these minority-majority relations, there are territorial
claims which further complicate the situation. But, for the moment, if we
concentrate on the socio-political, cultural, and economic levels, we see
that the post-Soviet independent states in the South Caucasus have not been
able to create stable and dependable infrastructures for economic
development, democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech within their own
societies, let alone for their disgruntled minorities. The regimes in
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have been unpopular in the last 10-12 years.
In Azerbaijan, the opposition is almost completely wiped out. When a society
lacks healthy political development, it is easy to see where the other
problems are coming from. If an Azerbaijani opposition in Baku cannot freely
express himself or herself or is thinking about reprisal, how can we speak
about the issue of the rights of Armenians in Karabakh?

In my opinion, in order for these conflicts to be properly resolved, there
is, first and foremost, the need for basic political structures that are
stable and a certain level of democracy and openness.

Aztag- Some people argue that the rise of nationalism led to these land
issues and ethnic conflicts. What is your take on that?

Hratch Tchilingirian- Nationalism is, of course, a part of the whole fabric;
but I would argue that nationalism is not the only reason that you have a
conflict there. Some people say, rather naively, `These people have always
hated each other and have fought wars throughout history', they present the
issue as if it were an innate thing. They fail to appreciate the objective
reasons that contributed to the conflicts -- at least in the Soviet period
-- in Karabakh, Abkhazia, or Ossetia. There were policies dictated by the
centre which affected education, cultural preservation, language teaching,
socio-economic priorities, etc. When you look at the record, there are
objective reasons that made these minorities unhappy; these factors feed
into the nationalistic ideology that is driven by the elite; we have to look
at these other factors as well; we cannot fully explain these conflicts only
by theories of nationalism.

Aztag- You are saying that during the Soviet era, these conflicts were under
control. Don't you think that some of the policies of that time have, in
fact, worsened the situation?

Hratch Tchilingirian- Yes, but one also has to remember that the Soviets had
this internationalist ideology where the ultimate goal was to create the
Soviet People -- individual nationalities and separate territories did not
matter. However, individual or separate nationalities or ethnic groups still
preserved their sense of national identity.

Aztag- Some scholars argue that although the Soviets wanted to create a
homogenous country, the leaders of individual states were using a
nationalistic rhetoric when tackling key issues in their respective
countries.

Hratch Tchilingirian- If one looks at theories of nationalism, one sees that
it is useful as a political program. So we have to know why nationalist
ideology is being used in this particular era. What is the purpose? Is it to
resolve or address certain issues? What I'm trying to stress is the context
in which events develop; things don't happen in a vacuum. The elite or the
leadership exploits certain fault lines within a society for nationalistic
purposes. Indeed, existing problems and conflicts in society provide such
opportunities for exploitation. One should also ask why conflicts happen at
a given time: the time factor, the change of leadership, the change of
climate, the change of politics is very important.

During the late 80s and early 90s, the societies in this region, as in other
parts of the Communist world, allocated the necessary resources -- human,
financial, military, or other -- to gain independence or autonomy. The
weakening of the center (Moscow) was one of the most favorable factors which
provided the republics and peripheral autonomies to re-appropriate power
from the center. And this was occurring very rapidly. The central government
in Moscow was collapsing and you had two or three layers of the state
apparatus trying to appropriate power from the center. When the center
completely collapsed, the republics declared independence and the autonomies
forced a divorce.

Aztag- You are stressing the fact that history does matter. But in conflict
resolution, how far back in history can one go to address the core issues?

Hratch Tchilingirian- As time passes, people forget why the conflict started
and what the initial spark that triggered the conflict was. The present
moment becomes the starting point of analysis; history and the beginning
point become less relevant. And this is part of the problem in this region
specially. Indeed, when you look at the way the mediators work, for instance
the Minsk Group, you see that what matters is today, the year 2004, not what
happened in 1988 or 1991. Yet, for the minorities in the conflict the
starting point is very important.

You have the present moment, which dictates the process of dealing with the
issues. The points of reference for the various groups involved in the
solution could be very different. For instance, on the one hand, you could
have a powerful country trying to impose a solution; and on the other hand,
you have the very people who are going to be affected by such a solution.
Their references or `starting points' could be very different. This is where
the issue of compromise becomes very important: how far back do you go and
what kind of criteria do you use to resolve the conflict. For instance,
presently Armenia is viewed as an occupying force as far as Azerbaijanis are
concerned; on the other hand, there is no reference as to why or when these
regions were occupied; it's irrelevant. Yet this is relevant for Karabakh
Armenians, it is relevant for at least certain groups in Armenia. So it is
very important to understand and analyze these various layers that add to
the complexity of the matter.

Aztag- How practical is the approach of solving the conflict by force?

Hratch Tchilingirian- My argument is that any quick or imposed solution in
this region would not be a lasting solution. When one looks at the history
of Karabakh or Abkhazia in the last 200 years, it is easy to see that there
have been various types of political or military conflicts every few years.
Any solution that does not address the fundamental issues of the conflict
would not be lasting. If a solution is imposed just as it was during the
Soviet period, the problems will resurface whenever there is an opportunity.
I believe one of the key issues that should be addressed is the
majority-minority relationship. How you manage and maintain that
relationship will determine the durability of the solution.

Aztag- So you think that democratizing the region would make the situation
better.

Hratch Tchilingirian- Democratic regimes provide a more conducive ground for
conflict resolution.

Aztag- What about the issue of territorial demands? Even if we had a
democratic Georgia or Azerbaijan, the conflicts would still be there because
of the land issue, wouldn't they?

Hratch Tchilingirian- Yes, I believe so, because especially in this part of
the world, territory is very important. In Europe, throughout history, the
situation was the same. But the European Union has made territory less and
less important. In the Caucasus, territory is still a very important
identity marker, it is a very important political and strategic factor, so I
don't think this region will become like a mini-EU any time soon.

If you look at the European Union, the issue of territoriality is not
important anymore, you can travel within the EU as if you are in one
country. Today, territorial boundaries are not contentious in Europe, to a
large extent because nobody is suppressed; various national or ethnic groups
are free to practice their culture, to speak their language. But when you
have discrimination, when you have inequality, then people want to protect
their socio-political boundaries; they want to be their own boss!

Aztag- It is no secret that Russia and the US have their strategic interests
in the Caucasus and each tries to enlarge its own circle of influence in the
region. How does this affect the already volatile situation in the Caucasus?

Hratch Tchilingirian- This issue has two dimensions: internal and external.
If you look at the internal situation, when the regime is weak and not
stable, then it would be affected by the big powers, whether positively or
negatively; the ruling elite itself needs the backing of a "sponsor" or a
big power, to secure its position.

The external aspect is that Russia has definite interests in this region;
historically this region has been part of the Russian sphere of influence;
it has been part of the Russian Empire for centuries. Russia is interested
in preserving that influence and role. The US has its own strategic
interests in this region, especially in the Caspian, so there is going to be
rivalry among the superpowers, just like any other region. I would add that
this competition is not unique to this region, it happens throughout the
world.

The issue also depends on how the countries in this region view their
strategic interests. For instance, it's very important for Armenia to have
good relations with Russia for security and strategic reasons. Armenia also
has trade and economic dependency on Russia, not the least of which is the
large remittances that come from Russian-Armenians who send money to
Armenia. So if there were a choice, Russia would be a priority -- even
though Armenia tries to have good relations with both Russia and the US and
virtually with everyone else.

Aztag- What's your take on the current situation in Georgia and the way
President Saakashvili is dealing with the separatist movements?

Hratch Tchilingirian- Well, I think any leader would wish or would want to
resolve conflicts in his country. Saakashvili has an interest to do that as
the new leader of Georgia. On the one hand, he appears to project a strong
position when it comes to dealing with these conflicts; on the other hand,
he sounds like he is willing to compromise, provide autonomy and so on. But
I would come back to my earlier point: it would ultimately depend on how
Tbilisi is going to manage its relations with the various minorities within
Georgia.

Aztag- In Adjaria, Saakashvili had his way rather easily, didn't he?

Hratch Tchilingirian- Yes, that was because the problem was limited in one
person, Aslan Abashidze. However, after the removal of the immediate
problem, if you do not provide the guarantees, the opportunities that these
people expect, then you are not resolving the conflict.

On the other hand, he has said that he is willing to give Abkhazia a very
wide autonomy; but it is debatable whether at this point Georgia has the
capacity to deliver. Does Georgia have the capacity and the resources to
deliver? I am not sure. Georgia is hardly paying the salaries of state
employees. Is Georgia ready to help the Abkhazians or the South Ossetians
with their needs? The same goes for Azerbaijan. I do not think the central
governments in Tbilisi and Baku are in any position to make the lives of the
Abkhazians or Karabakh Armenians any better at this point. What clear
incentives or gains do the minorities have? I believe this is missing from
the various solutions that are being proposed. At the end of the day, the
population, the villager, the farmer living in Abkhazia or in Karabakh or
wherever, is going to ask: What am I gaining that I don't have now through
this agreement? What is this going to add to my current situation?

When mediators look at it purely from a political perspective, it looks like
you could resolve the conflict. On paper, it looks like it is just a matter
of sharing territory or changing flags or sending a governor. But as
scholars we look at it at a deeper level, on the everyday level, the
sociological level -- for instance, the fact that people were once neighbors
and became enemies overnight.

Aztag- In your opinion, how far are we from the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict?

Hratch Tchilingirian- In my opinion, the conflict will take a very long time
to resolve; probably 20-25 years. This is not something that can be resolved
in a few years. Even if a peace agreement is signed within months or a few
years, it will take a long time to implement that agreement on the ground.
When you look at Cyprus, it took more than 30 years just to come up with a
framework, not a solution. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more than 50
years old and nowhere near resolution.

Aztag- Could you give us a brief background about the conflict in Abkhazia?

Hratch Tchilingirian- The Abkhaz conflict is going to take a long time to
resolve. It has a long history. There were inter-ethnic tensions throughout
the Soviet period.

The Abkhazian Autonomous Republic -- situated on the eastern Black Sea coast
with an area of 8,700 sq km -- was part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist
Republic, with a population of over 500 thousand. The Abkhazians constituted
a minority of 18%, compared with the 46% majority of Georgians. However, in
the late 19th century, before the 'Georgianisation' of the region, as Abkhaz
scholars argue, Abkhazians were the majority, with some 55% and the
Georgians counted for only about 25%.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Abkhazian-Georgian relations
deteriorated, when, in 1992, the Abkhazians reinstated their 1925
Constitution to prevent Georgian attempts to curtail the political status of
the autonomous republic. A full-scale war broke out between the Abkhazians
and Georgia, after the fall of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the ultra-nationalist
president of Georgia, which resulted in the defeat of the Georgians in
September 1993. Obviously, the Abkhazians were assisted by Russia, whose
policy, at least at the time, was to use the conflicts in Abkhazia and
Karabakh to pressure Tbilisi and Baku, which were rapidly drifting away from
Moscow's "sphere of influence".

A ceasefire between the Georgian and the Abkhazian was reached in 1994;
since then the United Nations have been involved in mediating a solution.
While unrecognized by the international community, Abkhazia, like Karabakh,
has achieved de facto independence in what is now the 'Republic of
Abkhazia'. Nevertheless, Abkhazia remains extremely isolated and extremely
dependent on Russia. The international community recognized only the
independence of what were the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics. The
international community, in fact, discouraged further break up of
second-tier `states' in the Soviet system, such as autonomous republics like
Abkhazia, and third-tier autonomous regions like Karabakh. As such, the
international community puts more pressure on the secessionists than the
recognized states.

The Abkhaz problem has many similarities with Karabakh, especially in terms
of independence, in terms of breaking off with the center, in terms of
determining their own affairs and lives, and so on. But it also has some
important differences. The Abkhazians were willing to have a federative
relationship with Georgia, but because Georgia was not forthcoming and did
not take it seriously, the Abkhazians declared full independence from
Georgia in 1999. And nowadays they talk about having a special association
or a membership association with the Russian Federation. This proposed
association is a model that does not exist in any other place in the world
yet. Abkhazia would not become a member of the Russian Federation or a
federal entity, but it will have a special, still to be defined association
with Russia. In a way Abkhazia will keep its independence, but in many ways
will dependent on Russia, as it is now.

Aztag- So being part of Georgia in any way is not an option for Abkhazia.

Hratch Tchilingirian- It is not a desired option for the Abkhazians. When
you speak to political leaders and ordinary people in Abkhazia, they say
they do not want to be part of Georgia, they prefer to be part of Russia.
But Abkhazia is very isolated from the rest of the world; they are very
dependent on Russia, so ultimately, Russia's role in the resolution of the
conflict will be a determining factor. On the other hand, Karabakh is
different from Abkhazia because it has an outlet to the rest of the world
through Armenia -- Karabakh is a virtual province of Armenia. Perhaps
legally or on paper Karabakh is a separate entity, but de facto, it is part
of Armenia.

Aztag- What do you think about the recent pronouncements of President
Saakashvili?

Hratch Tchilingirian- The nationalistic pronouncements of the President of
Georgia are not surprising, but the logic of his threats to sink Russian
ships going to Abkhazia is hard to understand. Saber rattling with Abkhazia
is one thing, but with Russia it has serious consequences. Russia still has
enormous levers in this region. Hostility towards Russia is not going to
make Georgia's position any better nor is it going to resolve the Abkhaz
conflict to Georgia's favor. I believe, once Saakashvilli's `Rose
Revolution' honeymoon is over, he is going to realize that the resolution of
Georgia's major territorial, political and economic issues depend on good
relations with Russia.

An Interview with Igor Mouradian

Interview with Igor Mouradian
By Khatchig Mouradian
Aztag Daily
May 8, 2004


Igor Mouradian has played a key role in the early stages of
the struggle for self-determination in Karabagh. A member
of The International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), Dr. Mouradian is also the author of a number of
books, in Russian, about geo-politics and geo-economics
( http://news.artsakhworld.com/igor_muradian/main/eng/index.html ).
I spoke to him in Beirut.


Aztag- What is your take on the current ruling elite in Georgia?

Igor Mouradian- It was clear from a long time that the culinary change
in Georgian politics will be connected to the right wing and not
the leftists. The right in Georgia would become the most popular
and the most active in the political arena. This has something to do
with the connection with the United States. Georgia was always keen
to demonstrate its orientation towards the west. In fact, this was
only a declaration; the orientation was only towards the U.S. However,
the U.S. is maintaining a very rigid framework in its international
politics in general and regional politics in particular. Some people
think that U.S. politics is very wide, but that's an illusion. The
interests of Georgia and other countries in the region cannot really
fit into the framework of U.S. interest, and the situation is dramatic
for this very reason.

Armenia has chosen a different path. Some analysts accuse Armenia of
being isolated. This is rubbish! These people either do not understand
the realities on the ground, or they're simply lying. In fact, Armenia
has a well-balanced international policy. Because of their policies,
Georgia and Azerbaijan are much more isolated than Armenia. The
main problem of Georgia is that the regime is not adequate. The
ruling elite is more than a marionette, it is extremely dependent on
foreign signals. It is not capable of creating long-term international
policies, because the U.S. is demanding that they quickly solve very
important issues. The new Georgian president does not really understand
the problems of the Georgian foreign policies.


Aztag- What are these problems?

Igor Mouradian- This country has chosen its main political and
economic profile, which is based on the development of transit and
services. If they want to succeed as a transit country, they should
be keen on establishing good relations with their neighbors. Georgia
cannot really develop the model it had chosen when it is in conflict
or confrontation with Russia. Of course, one can understand why the
Georgian elite is behaving this way: Russia has been carrying
forward inconsistent policies in the area, and it has done little to
improve its relations with Georgia.

The main problem that the Georgian politics is facing at the moment
is not Adjaria or Abkhazia and not even the economical issues,
but creating an effective and a centralized administration. Most
members of the new administration have already had the experience of
administrative work, but with no positive results. In my opinion,
the present Georgian administration is illegitimate, inadequate,
and it is clear that it's not permanent.

Aztag- How can it be illegitimate? After all, it is the people that
brought this administration to power.

Igor Mouradian- No revolution can create legitimate governments; it can
create efficient regimes, but never legitimate governments. Georgia
has neither. The leaders are very ambitious, and they will refuse to
be consistent in setting up a well-balanced regime. The current regime
is doomed to catastrophe. The foreign influences are too strong. The
situation is very dangerous for Yerevan not because this experience
could also be applied to Armenia, but because the current situation
in Georgia is very inconvenient for our interests and us.

Aztag- And what are, in your opinion, the factors that make an unstable
Georgia a problem for Armenia?

Igor Mouradian- One and only one factor: Communication. Even the
situation of Armenians in Georgia is not that much of a problem. The
politicians in the U.S., Europe and the Middle East are interested
in the following question: Could the Georgian scenario happen in
Armenia as well? That's rubbish. We have a completely different
social and economical system, our country is developing very fast,
the shortcomings of the ruling regime in Armenia are being compensated
by the presence and the activities of very stable political structures
within the country, the parliamentary process, and other factors. We
have created a powerful army, and at the same time, a very efficient
security system.

Armenia is approaching a time when the opposition will be represented
by nationalistic forces. The political parties oriented towards
Russia, Europe, or the U.S. will refuse to maintain policies that have
anything to do with external factors. Armenia will become a patriotic
nationalist state. In this respect, we can become an example to the
other independent states. And of course, our main problem will be the
problem of the elite, but our administration is much more adequate. The
problem of elite is a problem that runs for decades, and therefore,
it is not worthwhile to speed up any process; a revolution is not
something that is necessary. Revolution would make sense in only one
instance: if the ruling regime ignores the national interests.

Aztag- The western media refers to the current Georgian elite as
"nationalists" and "pro-western". You are saying that Sahakashvili's
government is extremely dependent on the U.S. How can this dilemma
of nationalism-dependence be explained?

Igor Mouradian- Every nation has its own notion of
nationalism. Nationalists cannot be "anti". If nationalism is directed
against a political pole or a major political force then it is
defective. Nationalism is not only about maintaining the uniqueness
of your own nation but also that of other people. Liberalism and
cosmopolitism, especially imperialistic liberalism and communism,
do not respect the notion of nation. But nationalism is fighting for
the uniqueness of all nations. Perhaps the ruling elite in Georgia is
not really nationalist. Or it might be a pseudo-nationalist regime,
or a racist regime. After all, any idea could be perverted. The thing is that
Georgia has established a European political system; the leftists and
the rightists are very obvious. Armenia doesn't have that; Armenia
has a different scheme: the conservatives and the liberals. I don't
think that any of those is better or worse than the other. Georgian
nationalism has not become a uniting force; it has not created
national ideas. Moreover, the policies of the regime have divided the
society. Of course, the situation in Armenia is not ideal; there, the
clash between fake liberalism and conservatism will become fiercer
with time. One has to be reminded that in Armenia, nationalism has
very deep roots. One can even speak of national fundamentalism.

Unfortunately, our social situation does not allow this national
ideology to become a real thing. One has to be reminded that
Pan-Armenian National Movement and the satellites of this movement
are not incidental. The basic aim of this movement was ideological
modernization, a desire to modernize Armenian politics...it would
have had positive results, of course, but their aims were very low.
Aztag- Currently, Ankara is bringing up the issue of opening the
borders with Armenia more frequently. Some analysts say that the
Armenian side might gain from such a move on the economic level, but
it has things to lose on the political front. What are the factors
at work here?

Igor Mouradian- The economic interests and the national interests
are not necessarily conflicting. currently, we do have trade relations with
Turkey. According to different estimates, we buy goods from Turkey
worth something between 100 and 160 million U.S. dollars. Our exports
to Turkey are worth about 20 million U.S. dollars. Politically, all this
doesn't change much.

There are two major problems for the U.S. in the region: The
Russo-Georgian relations and the Turkish-Armenian relations. Both
problems are connected with the idea of getting rid of Russian
influences. Despite the fact that the relationship between the
U.S. and Turkey have deteriorated recently and it continues to
deteriorate because the Americans are not insisting on solving
the Cyprus problem, the U.S. continues to insist on improving the
Armenian-Turkish relation. The American idea is very simple: once
they improve the relations, this will create security; Armenia
will be much more secure. It's a lie or failure to appreciate
the situation. The relations can be improved, the border may get
opened at some point and investments might start flowing to Turkey
and Armenia, but the threat will still be there. Turkey appreciates
only strong positions. We must be strong in order to become partners
with Turkey. Now we have a strong army, an efficient security system,
and developed international relations. We are more prepared to start
relations with Turkey. However, one has to separate two things that
have little to do with each other: our economic development and our
relations with Turkey, which include the issue of Genocide recognition.
Aztag- but couldn't the economic factor be used to pressure Armenia
to get other concessions on the political front?

Igor Mouradian- We speak of Armenia as some other country that has
nothing to do with us. Armenia is us. It all depends on us. We should
sort our own problems and not the problems of Turkey. We should do
everything we can to make sure that we have a government that has a
nationalistic agenda and is not a marionette. Refusal to push for the
recognition of the Armenian genocide, concessions in the Karabagh issue
will not improve our relations with Turkey. Turkey is not interested
in Karabagh at all and they are not interested in the opinions of
Azerbaijan. This is an illusion that has been created. Turkey has its
own tasks, its own problems. Turkey is more interested in the question
of genocide than in the question of Karabagh. It wants to show the
western community that apart from the genocide problem there's also
the Karabagh problem that Turkey is interested in.
Aztag- What are the strategic aims of Turkey in the region?

Igor Mouradian- They want to achieve firsthand political and economic
dominance in the region. Apart from pan Turkism, there's also the
doctrine of neo-Ottomanism. When it became clear that Turkey is not
capable maintaining its important presence in central Asia, and that
the U.S. is doing nothing to help Turkey become a Eurasian power,
Turkey has become more interested in neo-Ottomanism. I couldn't find a
better term to describe this doctrine, according to which Turkey must
suck non-Turkish people (Albanians, Bosnians, Georgians, Chechens,
and Uzbekistanis) into Turkish politics. Turkey is now interested in
closer regions like the Caucasus, the Balkans, Ukraine, and Iraq. It's
very important that the Armenian communities in the U.S. and the Middle
East appreciate one thing: the U.S. is now carrying out anti-Turkish
policies in the Caucasus. They are doing everything they can to make
sure that Turkey loses its influence on Azerbaijan, they are doing
everything they can to pressure Turkey by creating alternative air
bases in Georgia and they are also using the Armenian factor as a
tool for pressure. It seems that the U.S. likes to create a little
Israel in Armenia, simply because Armenia is the most stable, the
most organized country in the region.
Aztag- What do you mean by "a small Israel"?

Igor Mouradian- Israel means an isolated country serving as an aircraft
carrier for the U.S. It's a very dangerous perspective for us, we
shouldn't allow this to happen, we should maintain very good relations
with the Arab countries, Iran, and central Asian countries. This
is extremely important for us. Armenia has demonstrated that under
conditions that are far from perfect, it can make breakthroughs in
many areas. Georgia and Azerbaijan cannot be genuine partners of the
U.S. They are very unreliable partners not only for the U.S. but also
for Russia, Iran, and Europe. There are only two countries in the
south Caucasus capable of maintaining the role of strategic partners:
the republic of Armenia, and the N.K.R.
Aztag- Armenia boasts excellent relations with Iran, despite the
religious and cultural differences between the two countries. What
are the foundations of this alliance?

Igor Mouradian- The region is coming up with new alliance and with
new blocks that have nothing to do with religious affiliation. These
blocks they are called geo-civilizations, which are not formed within
a cultural-religious framework.

Aztag- So you don't believe in Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"
theory.

Igor Mouradian- I do believe in the clash of civilizations, but I
think alliances based merely on historical and cultural factors do not
work. The geo-civilizations which are based on geopolitical interests
are the ones that work. The Slavic countries are acting against
Russia and there's lots of conflict between Christian countries, and
between Muslim countries. And the major conflict of them all is not
the conflict between the Islam and Christianity, but between U.S. and
Europe. Islam civilization does not have a common policy. The Islamic
world is being used by many, even by Israel. The Islamic world is not
capable of creating a common policy; even the Arab world isn't capable
of doing that. Accordingly, however well the relations with Turkey and
Azerbaijan develop, Iran will never refuse to maintain good relations
with Armenia. This is because of fundamental geopolitical interests.
Aztag- What does the future hold for the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict? The
status quo cannot be maintained forever, can it?

Igor Mouradian- The conflict is not going anywhere. One
should understand a few things: Russia is not interested in any
changes. Russia is now maintaining its relations with Azerbaijan in
a completely different dimension. There are the other issues where
Russia and Azerbaijan understand each other well. Russia is supportive
of the political regime in Azerbaijan; there are also the issues
of Caspian oil, the Russian gas imports, the question of the Azeri
economic migrants in Russia, and some security questions connected
with Russian interests in northern Caucasus. The Azeri leadership
has no illusions about Russian intentions in the Karabagh problem.

On the other hand, Europe has no operational abilities in Caucasus at
all and has no goals or aims in the region. The only European task
is to make sure that Americans feel uncomfortable; this is the only
thing that they are interested in.

Turkey has no time at all for Karabagh. The Turks are terrified
of this topic, because if they are accused of supporting one side,
the Azeri side, it will create for them another problem in terms of
joining the EU. Iran is also very happy with the status quo.

In turn, the U.S. has only three aims: oil, oil and oil. Sometimes
people confuse priorities and goals; the priority is stability,
and the status quo perfectly corresponds to the U.S. interests. The
U.S. administration has had the chance to see for itself in Key West
that there's no political solution to the Karabagh problem, which
can only be solved militarily. The U.S. will not accept a military
solution, they're afraid of military solution, and they are supportive
of the current administration on one condition: Ilham Aliev should
not try to solve the Karabagh problem by resorting to the option of
war. For the U.S., if there is no political way, there is no other way.

If you had asked me three years ago "what is the future of Karabagh?" I
would have told you that it will stay like this for decades and it
will be capable of developing successfully in its current state. But
now, seeing the current movements and tendencies, I've come to
understand that the western community will have to decide the status of
uncontrolled territories (Kosovo, Bosnia, Taiwan, Sumatra, Palestine,
Karabagh, Adjaria, Abkhazia, the Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Cyprus
and possibly another 10 more territories including Kashmir and some
territories in Afghanistan).

Sometimes they ask the question "how many U.S. congressmen know the
surname of the Nigerian president?" I don't think that many do.
It's a country with 100 million people. However, Ghougasian,
the president of Karabagh, is known to many congressmen and so is
Denktash. They're playing an extremely important role in the external
balance of power. And this problem will persist and it should be
solved. Moreover, there's another question of task or problem: not
all the territories will receive its formal status, and the Americans
have discussed this publicly. Nevertheless, Karabagh has more chances
than anyone else does to become internationally recognized. Of course,
there is a danger when discussing the recognition of the N.K. state;
the question of territories will arise, but there is probably a way
out. Perhaps Karabagh will play an exceptional role in political
history by demonstrating how a tiny country coming out of the fierce
and bloody war can create a fascinating democratic society.