An Interview with Norman Naimark

An Interview with Norman Naimark
By Khatchig Mouradian
Aztag Daily
December 31, 2003

A senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Norman M. Naimark is also
the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies
and chairman of the Department of History at Stanford University. He
is an expert in modern East European and Russian history, Poland
since 1863, and the history of the German Democratic Republic since
World War II. His current research focuses on the Soviet occupation
of Eastern Europe after World War II and ethnic cleansing in the
twentieth century.

His book "Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century
Europe", published in 2001, studies "cases from twentieth-century
European history that help illuminate the process of ethnic cleansing,
its causes and effects". Aztag Daily contacted professor Naimark
requesting an interview and he gladly agreed to answer our questions
about genocide and ethnic cleansing in general, and the Armenian
genocide in particular.
AZTAG - Does one find any distinctive features in ethnic cleansing in
Europe in the 20th century when one compares it to ethnic cleansing
and genocide on other continents? Does the fact that Europe is the
"epicenter" of human rights and high levels of culture make such
calamities all the more shocking?

Norman Naimark - I think one has to consider Europe -- broadly
speaking, including Russia and the Turkey/Ottoman Empire -- the home
of ethnic cleansing. If one thinks of episodes of ethnic cleansing and
genocide outside the European continent, like the partition violence
in India in 1946-47, the Rwandan genocide, or the Cambodian genocide,
one could argue that the preconditions for these horrible events were
"exported" in some senses from Europe.

That Europe in the 20th Century was home to ethnic cleansing and
genocide is indeed more shocking, I think, because of the high
levels of culture and society. What could be more disorienting than
the Holocaust, for example, which saw one of the most civilized and
developed countries in Europe -- home of Goethe, Schiller, Weber,
Einstein, and Benjamin – turn on the Jews in such a vehement and
murderous fashion?

AZTAG - In "Fires of Hatred" you underline the difficulties of
differentiating ethnic cleansing from genocide, especially because
ethnic cleansing more often than not turns violent. What is the
importance of differentiating between violent incidents of ethnic
cleansing and Genocide?

Norman Naimark - I think intentionality is important in understand the
phenomenon of mass killing. In Bosnia, for example, or in postwar East
Central Europe, the intention of the perpetrators was to drive the
"enemy" (Bosnian Muslims and Germans) out of a concrete stretch of
territory, thus ethnic cleansing. This is not genocide; they didn't
care how they left, just as long as they left, using whatever violence
they thought was necessary to accomplish it. In the cases of genocide,
like that of the Jews or Armenians, the intent of the perpetrator is
murder, genocide. Both ethnic cleansing and genocide are crimes against
humanity. Genocide, I believe (as does international law), constitutes,
however, a higher level of criminality and it much harder to prove.

AZTAG - Is there any legal framework based on which people could be
held accountable for "ethnic cleansing" today?

Norman Naimark - The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia has included
ethnic cleansing among its listed crimes against humanity. Again,
it is an important crime, but not of the order of genocide. There
seems to be no special attempt to place ethnic cleansing in a separate
category. Instead it is joined with ideas of "forced deportation."


AZTAG - What about the moral accountability of bystanders?

Norman Naimark - I am not a moral philosopher and am unwilling to
judge the culpability of bystanders in this connection. Clearly,
they share some responsibility for what is going on. But I have been
much more concerned with demonstrating, historically, that ethnic
cleansing and genocide are the products of government planning and
the nationalist political elites that control those governments.

AZTAG - Do you think September 11th and the war on terror will change
the way the West responds to genocidal acts?

Norman Naimark - Yes, I believe the trajectory of the international
system has shifted dramatically from one that seemed increasingly
willing to deal with acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide, for
example in Kosovo, to one that is mesmerized by the "war against
terrorism." It is unclear where the "system" and its guiding star
at the moment, the U.S., will go from here. But I think it less
likely (take a look at Liberia, for example), that the U.S. and U.N.
will intervene in genocidal situations than in 1990.


AZTAG - How did your become interested about the Armenian genocide
and in what ways did your research on the Armenian genocide unfold?

Norman Naimark - I had heard about the Armenian genocide from Armenian
friends and found myself very confused by the contradictory nature
of Armenian claims on the one hand and Turkish protestations on the
other. The scholarly literature on the genocide is growing -- people
like Vahakn Dadrian, Richard Hovanissian, Taner Aksam, and Ronald
G. Suny have made important contributions -- but it is not nearly
as solid and developed as that on the Holocaust. As I consequence,
I wanted to study the documents myself, as a way to understand what
happened for myself. The older I get as an historian, the more I want
to see the documents myself in order to judge controversial problems.

AZTAG - Also in "Fires of Hatred" you say that "the concept of
Genocide does not fit the Armenian case perfectly", citing the fact
that Armenians in Constantinople and Smyrnia were left intact due to
the presence of foreign observers in the city and that some Armenians
were converted to Islam, and some Turkish officials ignored the order
etc. Some of these are, fortunately for Armenians, some "gaps" in
the plan to annihilate a whole race; do these gaps make a genocidal
act less genocidal, or less "perfect"?

Norman Naimark - What I tried to say in the book is that, first
of all, we are short of the kinds of documentation we have for the
Holocaust. Because intentionality is so critical for the determination
of genocide, it would be an easier case if we had more internal
Turkish documents that would demonstrate the intention of murdering the
Armenians. Also, genocide seeks to destroy all of a nation. Armenians,
as you know, could sometimes convert, escape to the mountains, stay in
certain locations, survive as Protestants or Catholics, etc. I don't
think there is a perfect or imperfect genocide. But conceptually,
the Armenian case does not fit neatly into our idea of genocide. I
believe it was genocide, as you know from my book. But it is not the
same kind of case as that of Hitler and the Jews.

AZTAG - In the book, you do not hesitate to use the "G" word when
you speak about the Armenian massacres and deportations. What were
the "pieces of information" that led you to conclude that this was,
in fact, Genocide?

Norman Naimark - The "G" word is important and I do believe it fits
the Armenian case. What convinced me more than anything was reading
the documentation of the various consuls and doctors and observers who
witnessed what was going on around them and reported it to Ambassador
Morgenthau back in Constantinople or to their respective governments
or bosses. Thus, there is an accumulation of first-hand eyewitness
evidence about what was being done to the Armenians that -- combined
with some other documents, the post-WW I trials of the Young Turks,
some remarks by the Young Turk triumvirate itself, and a few others --
convinced me this was intentional murder of a nation, thus genocide.


AZTAG - Do you consider the Armenian Genocide a template for other
genocides that followed?

Norman Naimark - I think the Armenian genocide was not so much a
template for genocide as an historical precursor of other genocides,
especially the murder of the Jews. We know Hitler and his circle knew
about the Armenian genocide. There is some question whether he actually
made the statement "And who remembers the Armenians now." Still,
the example of mass murder and the inability and unwillingness of the
"international community" to do anything about it -- which was clear
in the Armenian case -- certainly had some kind of influence on the
Nazi sense that one could do these sorts of things with impunity.

AZTAG - The Armenian Genocide is denied by Turkish governments, and
it is not recognized by a number of other countries, including the
USA. Naturally, without recognition and some form of reparation the
wounds would not heal. In your opinion, how can this issue be resolved?

Norman Naimark - You are right, there is only one way for healing
to take place, and that is for the Turkish government not only
to recognize what was done to Armenians, but to give historians
unrestricted opportunity to use Ottoman archives. I have participated
in conferences where, in a very preliminary way, Turkish historians
(usually from outside Turkey, but not only), and Armenian historians,
have discussed the genocide from their own perspectives. There IS
progress on this score. But there is much more work to be done,
including the building of a museum in Washington commemorating and
documenting the genocide. Healing will come, but it will take time
and it will take honesty. I hope soon the Turkish government will
come to this realization, as well.

An Interview with Roger Smith

Looking Back, Moving Forward
An Interview with Roger Smith
by Khatchig Mouradian
Aztag Daily

The best way to move forward is through looking backward, it is said. This
might not be a good idea when you are driving a car, but whenever "backward"
signifies turning your eyes toward the past, memory or history, this statement rings
as true as any established cliché.

"The Armenian Genocide provides many clues to why contemporary genocide
occurs, what its warning signs are, and thus offers some hope, that if the
nations will act, genocide in the making can be prevented," says Professor
Roger Smith in this interview. In a world plagued with genocide and ethnic
cleansing, we, the human race, have often failed to look back, acknowledge
our mistakes, learn from them, and hence move forward. Unfortunately, world
leaders today are more interested in making history - no matter how twisted
it comes out to be - than learning from it. "We learn from history that we
learn nothing from history," said George Bernard Shaw.

According to Paul Valery, "History is the science of what never happens
twice." Yes, probably Armenians will not be marched to the desert and
slaughtered again. But as Armenians continue to reflect on the uprooting and
the near extermination of their people in 1915, they cannot help but see the
path that led humanity to the Holocaust, to Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda and
most recently, Darfur.

"Perpetrators of genocide have learned from their own "study" of genocide
that they can commit the crime under the cover of war, in the name of
self-defense, will receive impunity, can deny that they committed genocide,
and that the world will forget," says Roger Smith. The message is loud and
clear. If you want to have the killing of 1.5 million Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire acknowledged worldwide, if you want the millions of Jews and
Gypsies slaughtered in Europe to rest in peace, then do something about
Darfur now! And act in a way so as to prove that Bernard Shaw was wrong and
that Paul Valery was right.

Roger W. Smith is Professor Emeritus at the College of William and Mary in
Virginia, where he taught courses in political philosophy and the
comparative study of genocide. Educated at Harvard and the University of
California, Berkeley, Smith has written widely on the nature, history, and
the possibilities of preventing genocide. He has dealt, among other topics,
with the roles of gender, denial, and the thirty-five year-long reluctance
of the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention that was broken only
in 1988. Smith has written the introduction to a recent edition of
"Ambassador Morgenthau's Story" (first published in 1918), a classic account
of the Armenian Genocide. His other works include "Women and Genocide" and
"Professional Ethics and the Denial of the Armenian Genocide," both
published in the journal Holocaust and Genocide studies in 1994 and 1995
respectively. One of Prof. Smith's most recent publications is "American
Self-Interest and the Response to Genocide," published in The Chronicle of
Higher Education on July 30, 2004. He is also the author of the entry on
"Perpetrators" in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity, which will be published in November 2004.

Professor Smith's public lectures have taken him to Armenia, Western Europe,
Canada and to numerous prestigious universities across the United States. He
has also given interviews to the Voice of America, the National Public
Radio, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Public Broadcasting
Service, participated in documentaries on genocide, and provided testimony
before the US Congress.
Professor Smith is co-founder and past president of the International
Association of Genocide Scholars. Currently, he is Program Director of the
Zoryan Institute's Genocide and Human Rights Program in Toronto (Information
about the course is available at www.zoryaninstitute.org ).

In this interview, he looks back at a century of Genocide.

Aztag- In an article published lately in the "Chronicle of Higher
Education," you say: "Relatively small, well-organized lobbying groups are
more likely to be effective in moving policy makers to act against genocide
than broad, but somewhat amorphous public opinion." Citing, among others,
the facts that public opinion doesn't have direct access to policy makers
and that human-rights groups have the expertise to be persuasive.
How effective have human-rights groups dealing with this specific issue been
when lobbying for a more assertive stance against genocides? Do you envisage
a better strategy for a more effective functioning of such groups?

Roger Smith- Human rights groups in recent years have multiplied, but the
effect on policy, whether in Bosnia or Rwanda, was not great. Budgets are
small, agendas differ, and resources and efforts tend to be scattered. But
mainly, they have run into the reluctance of the United States and other
countries to take action to prevent, or end, genocide. But things change:
Somalia cast a shadow over involvement in Rwanda; now the costs of not
acting in Rwanda cast a shadow over Darfur. In the present climate, perhaps
direct lobbying of decision-makers, whether in national governments or the
United Nations, will be more productive. But human rights organizations
must also create ways to lobby more effectively; this will require access to
greater resources, but in some instances internal changes and change of
focus; for example, away from individuals and toward policy and
institutions. Some organizations (Amnesty International) have been oriented
toward prisoners of conscience (that is individuals) rather than mass
killing; Human Rights Watch has taken a different approach, concentrating on
policy and institutions. Other organizations have been primarily concerned
with providing relief, and have seen themselves as having to be neutral
between perpetrators and victims (perhaps even removing such distinctions
from their vocabulary). Fewer, but stronger, organizations might also be
needed: effectiveness is not necessarily increased by a multiplicity of
groups. Nevertheless, I believe that human rights organizations, unlike a
somewhat amorphous public opinion, can help move policymakers to act against
genocide.

Aztag- During the annual meeting of the institute for the Study of Genocide
you said, referring to Samantha Power's Pulitzer prize book "A Problem from
Hell": " My one concern for Power's book is that in a few years she will
have to issue an updated edition, listing yet another genocide: one in
which, yet again, the United States stood by."
What is your take on the West's reaction to the atrocities in Darfur? Do you
think the chapter on Sudan will not differ from the previous ones?

Roger Smith- I am hopeful that Darfur may turn out differently, that the
world's reaction may bring the killing and destruction to a close. But
there are mixed signals: the US Congress calls what is taking place
"genocide," but just what it proposes to do other than some kind of
sanctions through the UN is not clear; on the other hand, the European Union
says that genocide is not taking place in Darfur, and thus would not be in
favor of active intervention. The UN Security Council has given a month's
deadline to Sudan to show improvement; the African Union seems to more
active than in the past, and various countries (including Rwanda) intend to
place monitors in the region. But Sudan continues to maintain that no
intervention is necessary, that the militias are outlaws, not proxies for
the regime. It is hard to say what will happen next, but my guess is that
no direct intervention will take place.

Aztag- In your testimony before the House Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights you
said: "The Armenian case is the prototype for much of the Genocide that we
have seen since 1945; it was territorial, driven by nationalism, and carried
out with a relatively low level of technology."

Can you please draw parallels between the Armenian Genocide and the other
genocides in terms of territory, nationalism, and technology?

Roger Smith- Many scholars and the general public thought of the Holocaust
as the model of genocide: they saw it as driven by racial ideology, that it
was transnational, killing persons from all over Europe, and that it used a
complicated technology to transport and kill in assembly line fashion
millions of persons; by those standards, genocides that took place before or
after the Holocaust tended to be described as "tragedies," but not genocide.

This had the effect of demeaning the victims of those genocides and
blinding us to the ongoing nature of genocide in the 20th century.
But most of the genocides that have taken place since 1945 do not fit the
characteristics ascribed to the Holocaust. Whether it was Bangladesh,
Burundi, Rwanda, or Bosnia, there was a pattern that the Holocaust did not
illuminate to any extent: where the killing was largely territorial, the
ideology was nationalism (Cambodia is different in this respect), and the
technology employed was at a relatively low level (hoes, machetes, bullets,
fire, death due to exposure, and starvation). Rather, the Armenian Genocide
of 1915 was where the parallels could be found; indeed, it is the prototype
for much of the genocide that has taken place since 1945 and is taking place
now in Darfur. In addition to the elements already mentioned, there is the
perpetrators claim that they were only defending themselves against
revolutionaries and subversives; that what took place was civil war, not
genocide. The Armenian Genocide provides many clues to why contemporary
genocide occurs, what its warning signs are, and thus offers some hope, that
if the nations will act, genocide in the making can be prevented.

Aztag- During a panel organized by the Zoryan Institute you said that "a
precondition for reconciliation is a shared, accepted historical account."
What do you think about the attempts to sidestep the issue of genocide in
order to achieve reconciliation (for example TARC)? Do you think "a shared,
accepted historical account" is achievable when the Turkish government
continues the policy of denial and the education system in Turkey is
bringing up generations with the same distorted view of history?

Roger Smith- I think that a precondition for reconciliation in any genocide
is a shared, accepted historical account. But this is lacking with Turks and
Armenians, both at the State level and the individual level. The issues
have little to do with actual history: rather Turkish denial and the
rewriting of history involve a defense of Turkish self-image and political
concerns. A mythological history would have to be replaced; but identity has
been built on this history; change would have disturbing effects, leading to
confusion and questioning the very legitimacy of the state. But in the long
term, this is the only way Turkey can master its past; the acknowledgment of
the Genocide will, if it comes, coincide with a greater democratization of
Turkey, and with a more open and pluralistic society. We will know that
Turkey has come close to democracy when its citizens can openly discuss what
was done in 1915 and how it has been denied and covered up for 90 years.
The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was an attempt to
bypass a common version of history. Its very title tells us something: it
contains "reconciliation," but not "truth." But ultimately, is not truth,
acknowledgment, necessary if full reconciliation is to be possible? The
commission was ill-conceived: it lacked legitimacy in how it came into
being, and in terms of its members, who were hardly representative of the
Armenian community. It was widely-viewed as a dodge, created by the State
Department and the Turkish government to delay Congressional and
international resolutions affirming the Genocide.

Partial steps toward reconciliation without public acknowledgment by Turkey
of the genocide could happen: Japan has never accepted responsibility for
its war guilt, yet enjoys good relations with the U.S. Some steps Turkey
could take, but may not unless pressured by the European Union: diplomatic
recognition of Armenia; opening borders; lift embargo against Armenia, allow
for free development of Armenian culture within Turkey; allow for free
public discussion of the Genocide; rescind its policy of educating its youth
(Armenian included) in genocide denial; stop building monuments blaming
Armenians for genocide; and abandon denial. But the issue of genocide would
remain; until this is acknowledged, no full reconciliation is possible.
It seems to me doubtful that Turkey will acknowledge the genocide. And what
would follow if it did? Armenians are not of one mind about this. But for
now, I think Armenians are right to look to public opinion in many countries
and to seek affirmation of the Genocide by national and international
bodies. Even the Pope has signed on.

Aztag- A New York Times book review mentions that there are 37,000 works on
Nazism, 12,000 of which have appeared in the previous five years alone.
The Armenian genocide, among others, is far less researched and documented
and, adding insult to injury, the campaigns of denial force historians to
dedicate much time and effort in order to falsify the claims of deniers and
revisionists.

What are, in your opinion, the challenges facing historians dealing with the
Armenian genocide a century after the fact?

Roger Smith- Although works on Nazism and the Holocaust continue to appear
at a rapid pace, there is increasing awareness among scholars that the 20th
century presented numerous other examples of human destructiveness There
is now an effort to research the many other cases of genocide, and to put
them in comparative perspective. What do the cases have in common? How do
they differ? Why were they previously ignored? How has denial affected
writing about them? What can genocides other than the Holocaust teach us
about the dynamics of destruction, warning signs of genocide, and possible
prevention?

The Armenian Genocide was well-known at the time it took place, but after
the 1920s almost dropped from sight. When I began teaching about genocide
some 20 years ago, there were few materials available on the Armenian
Genocide that I could assign in class. That has changed greatly in the past
few years; in fact, I am currently reviewing five books on the Genocide that
were published last year alone. But much needs to be done: research
completed, dissemination of the historical record, making the story of the
Genocide available to a wide audience.

But there are special problems that face those who write about the Armenian
Genocide. First, there are the linguistic skills needed. Then there is the
fact that many of those who deal with the genocide spend more than half
their time refuting the denial and falsification of the Turkish government
and its accessories in academia and the foreign offices of the U.S., Israel,
and Britain. There is also the problem of audience: outside the Armenian
community, there has been little public interest in what took place 90 years
ago. The Armenian example does not stand alone: how much do we hear about
Pol Pot and his utopian experiment of only 25 years ago? To reach a broad
audience and place the narrative of the first major genocide of the 20th
century before the public may require that the story be incorporated into a
larger, even universal, history. Several recent books, for example, have
attempted to connect the history of the destruction with the rise of an
international humanitarian movement in the United States. In this way, the
Armenian case remains what it is; a crime against a particular people, but
it also becomes part of a broader history. The challenge is to find
additional ways in which such connections can be made.

Aztag- In a recent interview with Professor Ben Kiernan, I asked him about
the importance of comparative genocide studies. Part of his answer was:
"While perpetrators of genocide seem to have benefited from their own
comparative analysis of the potential and possibilities for genocide in the
modern era, the rest of humanity has failed as yet to learn lessons from the
past that could lead to meaningful intervention in such catastrophes".
What have we learned from the comparative study of genocides? How realistic
is the belief that these studies will contribute in driving policy makers to
actively oppose genocidal campaigns wherever they happen?

Roger Smith- I agree with Professor Kiernan that perpetrators of genocide
have learned from their own "study" of genocide that they can commit the
crime under the cover of war, in the name of self-defense, will receive
impunity, can deny that they committed genocide, and that the world will
forget. Even many of the techniques of destruction are transportable and
easily available: concentration camps, deportations, destruction of food
supplies.

Comparative genocide studies can help us understand the conditions under
which mass violence, including genocide, is likely to take place; it can
help identify warning signs of the impending violence; and it can suggest
ways in which genocide can be prevented. But it will also, as discussed in
my essay in THE CHRONICLE, indicate the patterns of governmental inaction
where genocide is concerned and the reasons for that. Thus, the problem of
prevention of genocide is not simply a question of knowledge, but of
political will. My own view is that the single most effective means to end
the slaughter of so many millions is for states to expand their concept of
national interest to include the prevention of genocide. The arguments for
this are humanitarian, but also follow political realism: genocide
frequently spawns regional wars, leads to the outflow of huge numbers of
refugees (some 10 million from Bangladesh in 1971, millions from Rwanda and
Darfur), the economic costs are far greater than the cost of early
intervention. Whether scholars and human rights activists can persuade
policy makers to redefine national interest is not clear, but it is a goal
that should be high on their agenda.

There are many other things that I have learned from the comparative study
of genocide: differences between ancient and modern genocide; the fact that
genocide throughout most of its long history was committed almost
exclusively by men, but that this began to change in the 20th century; the
evolution of the technology of destruction, yet the reappearance of many of
its "primitive" methods (fire, starvation, handheld weapons) in the
contemporary period. I also learned that in ancient times rulers boasted of
destroying whole groups: no denial for them. Indeed, they erected monuments
so that their annihilation of whole groups would not be forgotten. And,
yes, I learned much about human nature.

Aztag- You have taught courses on Genocide for 20 years. In what way have
your approaches to teaching methods changed? In what way has the approach of
student to the subject matter changed?

Roger Smith- My seminar on genocide had 15-20 advanced undergraduates and
graduate students. The course was comparative in scope and dealt with the
following questions: what is genocide? Why does it occur? Who is
responsible? How can genocide be prevented? My approach was to involve the
students as much as possible in discussion and to get them to confront the
issues instead of just taking notice of them. Much of the discussion was on
responses of students themselves: their assumptions about human nature,
about how it is possible for anyone to commit genocide, about our
responsibility as citizens, about our own stereotypes and prejudices.
My own approach to the course did not change much over the years, but I
added new material and we had to add new cases studies. But one had to
guard against becoming "numb" after confronting so many cases of genocide
over the years. I remember too that students worried that they would fall
into either despair over their inability to prevent genocide, or, faced with
so many examples of mass killing, throw up their hands and say about yet
another genocide, "What's the big deal?"

I do think, though, that the students changed somewhat over time in how they
responded. When I first started the course in 1981, the students were
fixated on the horror of genocide and could not believe that anyone other
than monsters could commit such acts. As we proceeded, they came to realize
that ordinary men and women could do these terrible things. But the groups
I had in the 1990s had greater awareness of the frequency of genocide; they
grew up, so to speak, with Bosnia and Rwanda. Their focus was less on the
horror and more on how they could prevent genocide, how they could become an
active force for the protection of human rights.

I retired three years ago, and since there are still few scholars who work
in the area of genocide studies, no one at my university has continued the
course. On the other hand, the past three summers I have taught in the
Zoryan Institute's Genocide and Human Rights University Program, a two week
intensive course (9-5) at the University of Toronto. Again, this is a
seminar, with about 22 students, who come from many different countries and
ethnic groups. There are Armenians from Canada, Lebanon, Uruguay, the U.S.;
Turks and Kurds from Turkey; students from Germany, France, the Netherlands,
and several countries in Latin America. The students have found it a
powerful experience: they bond closely, rid themselves (to a large extent)
of misunderstandings, and, in many cases, leave the course determined to
pursue further study in genocide studies. In its own way, on a small scale,
the seminar contributes to dialogue, understanding, and maybe personal
reconciliation. As one of the students said, "We became family."

An Interview with Robert Melson

Revolution and Genocide
An Interview with Robert Melson
By Khatchig Mouradian
Aztag Daily
February 10, 2005


“All victims of disasters think their disaster is unique in the world. It's a bit like having someone very close to you die in your family; you really don't want someone rushing to you saying, "I'm sorry this person died, but let me tell you that somebody else also died!" says Robert Melson in this interview.

As a survivor of the Holocaust, Melson has reason to feel that the suffering of his people was unique. However, trained in comparative politics, he also finds it important to draw parallels between the Holocaust and other Genocides. “If you're going to have some understanding, you have to compare,” he notes. In his book “Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust” (University of Chicago Press, 1992), Robert Melson does exactly that.

For him, “uniqueness does not mean incomparabilty, and comparability does not mean equivalence.”

Robert Melson has received his PhD in Political Science from MIT (1967). His research covers genocide and ethnic conflict in plural societies. Currently, he is the President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. His book, “Revolution and Genocide” won the PIOOM Award from Leiden University for the best book in the field of Human Rights for 1993 and was also nominated for the Grawemeyer award. His other publications include, “False Papers: Deception and Survival in the Holocaust” and “Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism” (with Howard Wolpe).

In this interview, conducted by phone on January 13, 2005, we discuss a number of issues related to genocide.

Aztag-You define genocide as “a policy initiative that uses massacre and other means to eliminate a communal group or social class from a social structure.” This definition is, as you yourself have noted, both wider than the UN definition and narrower. Why did you opt for this specific definition?

Robert Melson- Well, what I was trying to do is to solve the problem of the UN Convention (on Genocide). Many argue that the UN definition is too narrow, because it doesn't include political and socio-economic groups. It is also argued that the definition is too broad because it doesn't make a distinction between genocide in whole and genocide in part. My definition takes into consideration both criticisms. However, I'm not fixated on definitions; What I'm really interested in is the process, the reality of what leads to genocide and what stops genocide. Genocide, to me, is a planned wide-scale destruction of innocent human beings in its largest sense, and what I was doing in the book was trying to be scholarly and more exact as far as definitions are concerned, but it's not the most important thing.

Aztag- In one of your lectures, you say, "My parents began to discover the truth about what had happened to the jewish people, but it was knowledge without understanding." Was it the need to "make sense of the insensible" that shaped your research interests?

Robert Melson- Yes, I think that's a good way of putting it. I'm trained as a political scientist, and as I was doing political research I found that on the one hand I was practicing my profession and on the other hand, what was uppermost on my mind and what was most worrying to me was my past; the Holocaust, the destruction of my family. So the personal solution for me was to bring my research and my thinking in line with my interest and that's what I did; I have to say that it took a number of years to work this out.

Aztag- And why is this “understanding” important for a survivor of genocide?

Robert Melson- That's a very good question. Understanding doesn't bring anybody back to life, I'm not even sure understanding helps to prevent future genocides --although people have stressed that without understanding, prevention is not possible. At its most fundamental psychological basis, without understanding you're at the mercy of the past; you feel that you have no control over it, you feel that you're victimized by it. Although understanding does not start a process of rebuilding the past, or bringing back the people who are victimized, but at least it gives you some control over your own thoughts. Understanding is, in a way, a selfish process, it's a way of dealing with your own crisis. I guess the analogy would be someone who has a serious illness --let's say cancer-- and knows it's a terminal cancer. One of the things he would do is to try to understand cancer; this won’t make the cancer go away, but the understanding helps him to deal with it. Maybe that's as good as an answer as I can give you.

Aztag- What about comparing?

Robert Melson- I'm not a historian, I'm not a sociologist and i'm not a psychologist; I do comparative politics. So I naturally use the methodology and the approaches that I've been trained with, and I happen to think that it's the best way. I think that is the way; if you're going to have some understanding, you have to compare. Comparison is, in a way, the basis of all science. Without it, you can't understand or even measure something! You have too have a reference point; how big is the lamp that is on my desk? The question is, “compared to what?”

Aztag- And being a Holocaust survivor and a researcher of the Holocaust, there is the sensitive issue of uniqueness, which can make comparison a harder endeavor, can't it?

Robert Melson- I guess all victims of disasters think their disaster is unique in the world. It's a bit like having someone very close to you die in your family, you really don't want someone rushing to you saying, "I'm sorry this person died, but let me tell you that somebody else also died!" You're not in the mood for that; it’s not appropriate. However, if you're a physician and you're trying to understand a disease, you look for different cases of this disease --again going back to the notion of comparison--to be able to see under what conditions does this disease manifest itself.

Some parts of the Jewish community have been sensitive to the issue of comparison, both because the Holocaust was recent and so many people were affected by it, but there is another reason the uniqueness issue came up for the Jews; very often they were told "Well, yes, it's terrible that there was Holocaust, but many other people have suffered, so don't make such a big fuss about it, be normal like everybody else." And the honest reaction has been "Give us a chance to grieve a little bit! Give us a chance to bury our dead before you tell us to become normal." So there was a kind of an emotional reaction toward the comparison. But by now - we're not in 1955 - by 2005, with the Cambodian and Rwandan Genocide and with increased awareness on the Armenian Genocide, I think most people do recognize that there are more things in the world than one particular people being destroyed.

Aztag- Can you please briefly explain the argument you present in “Revolution and Genocide”?

Robert Melson- The main points are both in the introduction and the conclusion of the book. I was trying to compare the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust, and I was trying to look not only into the ideology of the Young Turks or of the Nazis, but also the circumstances under which both of these Genocides occured. A revolutionary transformation that occured in the Ottoman Empire with the coup against Abdul Hamid, and the circumstances were WWI. And then if you look at the Holocaust, it was the coming to power of Hitler which was also a kind of a revolution - he made it quite clear that he was a revolutionary and that the Nazis were revolutionaries - and the circumstances were WWII. So in both cases you have revolutionaries coming to power and then a genocide occuring during wartime.

And then a question comes up: Why? What is it about revolution and wartime that can, under certain circumstances, lead to genocide? I think the simple idea behind it is that revolutionaries try to transform their societies in profound ways, and one way to transform a society is to eliminate groups that don't fit into the identity that the revolutionaries would like their society to have. And what war does is that it enables these radical measures to take place, because wars close off societies and they call for military solutions to social problems. Now it's not true that every revolution leads to genocide - the American Revolution didn't lead to genocide, the English Revolution didn't lead to genocide - but under some conditions, some revolutions do lead to genocide. Similarly, not all genocides are products of revolutions. The destruction of Native Americans and the destructions of peoples in Africa were products of Imperialism, not revolution.

Aztag- When I was reading your book, I kept thinking about other cases of genocide, the Cambodian Genocide, the Rwandan Genocide…

Robert Melson- Yes, I just wrote and article about this in the book "The Specter of Genocide" edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. In that chapter, what I do is extend the analysis from the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust to Rwanda. And again we have the pattern of revolution in the 1950s – the revolution in 1959 - and the Hutu coming to power, displacing the Tutsi, articulating a racialist ideology, the Hamitic ideology claims that the Tutsis were not originally a part of the nation, that they had come from Somalia or Ethiopia and, therefore, they ought not to have any power and they ought to be demoted from any postions that they have; very soon after, massacres occured. When you talk to people in Rwanda, they tell you that the genocide did not start in 1994, noting that the process of the genocide started in 1959. The war was the war between RPF (the Rwanda Patriotic Front) starting in 1990. Therefore, again, in Rwanda you have the conditions of revolution and war leading to genocide.

Aztag- What about Darfur? The events that have lately caused the displacement of more than a million people and the death of thousands of others; many are calling what is happening there genocide, others are falling short of using the word.

Robert Melson- Again, I know that president Bush and the US Congress have used the term "genocide", then again, if you go back to the UN definition, it talks about genocide in part and genocide in whole. Genocide in whole means extermination; this is what happened to the Tutsis, the Armenians, and the Jews in Europe. I think in Darfur there is genocide, but it's more like ethnic cleansing, it resembles more what happened in Yugoslavia, where people were being driven out and were being “punished” for political activities; this is not a planned extermination, but it's bad enough! Tens of thousands people have been killed already, and if there's not enough support, more people will be killed, so it is a genocide in part, but it is not the kind of extermination that I wrote about.

Aztag- When talking about the causes of the Armenian Genocide, Dadrian and Suny do give a minimal credit to the “provocation thesis”, according to which the actions of the Armenians caused the perpetrators to react with violence, but you completely dismiss it.

Robert Melson- I think the difference between Dadrian and Suny and me is a matter of emphasis. We all recognize that there were Armenian bands, that Russian troops committed atrocities against Turkish villagers in the Eastern Vilayets and so on. The real question is: Did these provocations cause genocide? Bernard Lewis and Turkish "explainers" argue that the provocations were the basis of genocide. My argument was rather simple, in any provocation, whether it's the Armenian genocide or when you're provoked by a colleague at work, how you react doesn't depend on the provocation, it depends on you-- what you are thinking , what your attitude is towards your colleague. Your action is not an automatic reaction to the provocation. If you're walking down the hall, and a colleague accidentally bumps into you, and you push him hard, your reaction is not automatically a product of his action. It's a product of you being mad that morning or disliking that person or being an aggressive person yourself. Consequently, to understand the actions of any person who is conducting violence you have to understand what motivates that person; it's not enough to look at what the victim has done. The victim might have done something, or the victim might have done nothing. That's it, that's really the basis of the argument. So what I was trying to argue is “let's look at what was happening to the Young Turks, what was going through their minds, rather than what the Armenians were doing.”

Aztag- You say in one of your papers that people sometimes emphesize the nationalism of the Armenians without looking at the nationalism of the Turks.

Robert Melson- Exactly. I mean, sure, there was nationalism - the Dashnaks, the Henchaks- yeah, there were nationalist movements. but what about the Turks?

Bernard Lewis's book "The Emergence of The Modern Turkey" is a wonderful book, a great book, but when it comes to the Armenian Genocide, his treatment is very strange. It's as if somehow the Turks became some kind of an automatic pilot, and had no conceptions of their own, no ideology of their own. Their ideology was nationalism, of course.

Aztag- What are your research interests currently?

Robert Melson- Well, since then, I've thought about the Rwandan Genocide and I wrote that article on that. I've also written a memoir of my family's experiences during the war, it's called "False Papers."

Lately, I've been thinking about prevention. At some point, one has to think, “This analysis should be helpful, it should lead to helpful policies”. Therefore, in terms of the study of genocide, I've become interested in the question of prevention and the question of resistance. These are two questions I've been thinking about, and, probably, will write about comparatively, using the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and the Rwandan genocide.

I teach a course here on the Holocaust and Genocide, and very often, one of the questions the students ask me is: "Why didn't these people resist being killed?" And my answer is: "Because they were not prepared to resist. They were not an armed population, and they were being attacked by an armed organisation; usually it takes a while to organise resistance, and by the time that while has passed by, it's too late, most of the people are already dead.

Aztag- What cases of resistance do you have in mind?

Robert Melson- Exactly. For example the resistance at Van, or the resistance at the Warsaw Ghetto, the resistance in parts of Rwanda. In some cases there was resistance, in many cases there was none! And very often what the victims do is they blame themselves, or they blame their culture.

The very same generation that suffered the Holocaust has been accused of being too aggressive, too armed, and too expansive. On the one hand, it's too passive, on the other hand it's too aggressive. so I don't think that cultural explanation is very good, I think a better explanation is the situational/structural explanation; people who don't expect to be killed are not prepared to resist, and therefore, they won't resist! And it's a kind of a waste of time to look at the culture and try to explain, in that context, why they don't resist. So that's my thesis.

There have been heavy-duty studies of Jewish cultures, of how, for centuries, the Jews looked the other way while violence was meted out to them, because they had no chance to resist, just like the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

The fact of the matter is that, if people can get organised, and if they can get weapons, they resist.

Aztag- This can also make the provocation thesis less and less sustainable, doesn't it?

Robert Melson- That's a good way of putting it. If people are so provocative, why didn't they resist? And that's right! I mean, that's a very good point that you're making, at the same time people are accused of provoking the genocide, and they're also accused of being passive and not resisting. The other thing is this whole issue of denial. They provoked the genocide, they were too passive, but of course, there was no genocide! It's a wonderful package of demonizing and humiliating the victims all over again. First they're killed, then they're told they were killed because they provoked the killing, then they're told they should have resisted, then they're told they weren't killed! It's a great package!

Aztag- Historians and political scientists often speak about comparative genocide as a way of understanding and then being able to prevent genocide. But the fact of the matter is that we say “Never Again” and then we have it again and again and again, so how helpful is it? Isn't everything in the end about real politics? One might think: "No matter how much you compare and analyze, you won’t change much, because everything boils down to real politics and the interests of superpowers.”

Robert Melson- Well I think there's a grain of truth in what you're saying. In Samantha Power’s book "A problem from Hell: America and the age of Genocide", the basic argument is that it’s not an accident that the United State does not prevent genocide; it doens't want to prevent genocide, unless its interests, as you put it, are immediately hurt. It doens't want to risk its people, it doens't want to risk its wealth. We have beautiful words, we have beautiful sentiments but nothing much happens, and the best example of that is Rwanda, because the Holocaust occured under conditions of World War, and so did the Armenian Genocide and it was very hard to intervene. However, in Rwanda, a few battalions of US Marines could have prevented the whole business. The Real Politic played an important role.

I guess scholars and researchers contribute a little bit, but they cannot substitute their decision making for the decision making of people in power. I think what they can show is that there are signs, that a genocidal situation is developing, and that prevention in an early stage is not that expensive. It's not necessarilly the sending in of troops and of having a loss of life on the part of those people who are saving others. For example in the Rwandan Genocide, there was call for genocide on the radio and the US and the UN didn't want to jam that radio for example. There were public statements made by people in power threatening genocide, no one reacted to it, no one said "look, we're going to impose severe sanctions on you, we're going to freeze your external balances, bank accounts".

There are many things that can be done if people pay attention to signs, to warning signs, and I think that this is where scholars can be useful. What are the some warning signs that a genocide is about to occur? I do think that if you have a deeply divided society that’s undergoing a revolution, heading into war, I think those are warning signs; people can pay attention to it or not pay attention to it, but at least as a scholar, you can say "look, why don't you pay attention to that early and not before it's too late?" That's where you can be helpful, but of course, our influence is limited. I'm a professor, I type! I don't command armies!

Aztag- And you might also help create greater awareness…

Robert Melson- Sure, sure. The world is complicated, it's not only real politique. Out there, there is a worldwide human rights sensitivity, people do react to, for example, the Tsunami. You have the tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the world got mobilized around this right away, millions of dollars were spent to help people and so on...Why wasn't this mobilization there for when Rwanda occured? So there is a human rights movement, it's almost like an anti-slavery movement in the 19th century, in the 20th and the 21st century there are lot of people around the world who are concerned about these things and they can be mobilized for action and they should be mobilized for an action, but there's also Real Politique; people who are in power define things narrowly, and they pay attention to public opinion, they pay attention to the costs of actions, and if the actions are expensive in terms of money and lives they won't do it. If the actions are not so expensive, and there was public pressure to do something, they might do something, I'm stressing the obvious here, I think.